(Part I) Bukele’s State of Emergency in El Salvador
By Viviana García Pinzón & José Salguero
February 27, 2024
On February 4th, El Salvador held its general elections, marking a historic occasion as the first since the era of military dictatorships in the 20th century to transpire amidst a declared state of emergency. Even in the absence of official results, mere hours after the closure of the last polls, the incumbent Salvadoran President and unconstitutional presidential candidate, Nayib Bukele, declared himself the victor, claiming an 85% share of the total votes and at least 58 out of the 60 available General Assembly seats for his party, Nuevas Ideas.
Regardless of the commitment by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to an official recount in the legislative elections due to undeniable irregularities and systematic failures in the tallying process, Bukele’s second term seems all but confirmed if not eagerly anticipated by Salvadoran society, even if his election should not have taken place to begin with according to six articles of the country’s constitution. These results mark a pivotal step in an unwavering march towards autocratic rule. A march that the “Philosopher King”, as the Salvadoran autocrat calls himself on his X account, started when he took office in 2019.
At the core of Bukele’s unprecedented concentration of power lies a security strategy of coercive pacification and the instrumentalization of fear. The crackdown on gang structures and the subsequent decrease in homicide violence and extortion brought about a dramatic change in the daily life of communities that for years have lived under the constant threat of gang violence (Grillo, 2023; Insight Crime, 2023). The policy’s impressive results are by all measures the main source of Bukele’s enormous popularity. In turn, this popularity has stifled any opposition to the growing dominance of the executive power over the legislative and judicial branches.
President Bukele greets supporters, 28 November, 2023. Source: Casa Presidencial El Salvador.
In this scenario, far-reaching “Iron Fist” policies without regard for basic human rights were not only possible but also convenient for Bukele’s political agenda of fear-mongering; he even went so far as to assert that losing a single seat could lead to the opposition releasing all gang members from prison. Autocratization and Bukele’s security strategy are interwoven, mutually reinforcing each other. Rather than serving to protect the citizenry, the central purpose of the latter is to enable Bukele’s political project (Wolf, 2024).
In the remainder of this piece, we revisit some of the pivotal developments that have shaped El Salvador’s path from a violent democracy (Arias and Goldstein, 2010; Montoya, 2018) towards becoming an electoral autocracy (Matovski, 2021). We critically examine the role of the security policy and the state of exception, shedding light on its myths and contradictions. Finally, we question the long-term implications of President Bukele’s narrative of ‘perpetual exceptions.’
The Dictator’s Wake
Neither the 1992 peace accords, which ended the Salvadoran Civil War, nor the transition to democracy solved the deep-seated socio-economic problems of Salvadoran society (Kurtenbach, 2010; Wade, 2016). Facing pervasive corruption and impunity, and persistent poverty and socio-economic inequalities amid soaring levels of violence and insecurity, it was not surprising that Salvadorans grew increasingly disenchanted with democracy (Fundaungo, 2021; IUDOP, 2016; Latinobarómetro, 2018).
Bukele’s rise to the presidency was driven by the citizenry’s dissatisfaction with both the political system and democracy. His victory not only represented the breakdown of the two-party system formed by the right-wing ARENA party and the left-wing FMLN, it also marked the end of the post-transition political system (Call, 2019). Ever since becoming president, Bukele further leveraged citizen discontent and the widespread idea that Salvadoran democracy is broken beyond repair to advance his political project, increasingly dismantling the system of checks and balances and rigging the institutional architecture to strengthen his grip on power.
From symbolic gestures to concrete reforms, Bukele has spared no efforts to assert and expand his power. For instance, in February 2020, he commanded the military to encircle the National Assembly to pressure lawmakers into endorsing an anti-crime bill. Later, after the outbreak of COVID-19, the reaction of El Salvador was marked by the expansion of executive political power and Bukele’s rebuke of attempts to establish democratic controls by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Hallock & Call, 2021). Bukele’s power grab gained impetus after the legislative elections in 2021 when his Party, Nuevas Ideas, secured 56 out of 84 seats. Bukele used his supermajority in Congress to overhaul the Judicial Branch. The changes included the removal of the Attorney General and all five judges from the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court and a reform of the judicial term, leading to the retirement of around a third of all judges in the country as well as prosecutors and other staff members.
The enactment of the state of emergency by the Legislative Assembly in March 2022 and its successive extensions created a key avenue for the dismantling of the battered democratic institutions. The state of emergency was the reaction to a spike of violence in which Mara Salvatrucha (or MS-13) led the killing of 87 people in three days, marking the end of an alleged pact between the gangs and the government. The state of emergency legislation encompasses the suspension of a wide range of constitutional rights and a set of reforms of the security and judicial systems. The launch of a revamped version of the mano dura (“Iron Fist”) policies provided Bukele with a new opportunity to legitimize the concentration of power in his hands. Along with the traditional political elites, the gangs were positioned as the enemy of Salvadoran society and the state. Bukele has often portrayed them as the flip side of the political elites, asserting that they constitute a two-headed threat against which the country must battle.
The state of emergency unleashed a ruthless security strategy based on massive incarceration and the continuous patrolling of police and the military in the streets. The strategy yielded results. According to government figures, El Salvador has witnessed a significant decline in its murder rate, dropping from over 106 murders per 100,000 people in 2015 to a rate of 2.4 in 2023. Beyond the numbers, it is undeniable that the exit of the gangs—the actors that have brought about desolation and terror—translated into tangible improvements in the daily lives of a large share of the population. The strategy’s brutality and widespread human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2022) have not tarnished Bukele’s popularity. On the contrary, in the most recent Latinobarómetro (2023), Bukele is the president with the highest approval ratings in the region (90%).
The popularity propelled by the security strategy underpins the transformation of the state of emergency from an exceptional condition into a permanent mode of government and social control. Remarkably, despite the electoral process unfolding amidst the inevitable presence of military personnel and their paraphernalia, the populace appears to accept this reality without resistance and, perhaps surprisingly, with a sense of wonder.
The Emperor’s New Clothes
On the anniversary of the state of emergency, Breda (2023) —a political analyst and expert on violence in Central America— had already cautioned about the potential barriers and dangers associated with exporting such a measure. Despite these warnings, the recent electoral results may embolden other political leaders in the region, inspired by Bukele’s sway over Salvadoran society. Emulating his approach risks framing their security policies as a trade-off between short-term effectiveness and the rule of law, a perilous prospect for democratic health in Latin America.
Therefore, it is imperative to persist in deconstructing the mythologies surrounding Bukele’s state of emergency, exploring its nuanced and impossible-to-replicate contexts that cannot (and should not) be replicated elsewhere. Hopefully, in doing this, we might contribute to revealing the true colours of the emperor’s new clothes. Adding to Breda’s proposal, we address two specific myths.
President Bukele meets with security officials, 5 January, 2023. Source: Casa Presidencial El Salvador.
The first one suggests that the radical transformation of the security landscape, mostly propelled by the defeat of the gangs, is the exclusive outcome of the implemented “Iron Fist” strategy. The imagery of half-naked, tattooed men, constantly referred to as ‘cancer’ by Bukele himself, being stacked in his megaprison, CECOT, awaiting collective sentencing and permanent confinement, creates a tantalizing propaganda narrative. Yet, amidst his triumph, an uncomfortable truth persists, one consistently denied by the autocrat and his allies, no matter the indisputable evidence: Bukele negotiated with the gangs.
Some reports suggest a connection between the dismantling of criminal networks in El Salvador and clandestine negotiations between the national government and gang leaders. In essence, the gangs’ apparent passivity and lack of armed response may be partially influenced by decisions made by the leaders of these criminal structures, who curiously remain absent from government propaganda. Particularly noteworthy is the illicit release of a prominent leader of the MS-13 gang, Elmer Canales, known as “Crook,” and a subsequent failed attempt to recapture him through a Mexican cartel operative. These events challenge Bukele’s discourse and could hold significant implications for his international stance, especially with El Salvador’s most important geopolitical partner, the United States.
A second myth revolves around the notion that the state of emergency poses a threat only to gang members and their associates. In response to criticism regarding the detrimental impact of mass incarceration on basic civil rights and liberties, Bukele and his officials often retort with a popular saying: ‘el que nada debe nada teme’ or ‘he who has nothing to hide has nothing to fear.’ According to the government’s narrative, law-abiding citizens should not fear the state of emergency, as it was established precisely to protect them. This message is complemented by a dehumanizing discourse against incarcerated individuals and their families.
However, evidence shows that no one is fully shielded, as violence and state arbitrariness are an ever-present threat (Toscana, 2023). El Salvador has become the country with the highest incarceration rate in the world. Human rights reports have documented that a significant portion of the 75,000 people imprisoned since the beginning of the state of emergency were arrested arbitrarily following internal quotas set by security officials and without evidence of any ties to gangs. The NGO Socorro Jurídico Humanitario, for instance, estimates that at least 20,000 detainees are innocent. By August 2023, 7,000 of those whose alleged association with gangs lacked sufficient evidence had been released, but there is still no real plan for reparations.
Social leaders and dissenting voices, ranging from trade union members to environmental activists and human rights defenders, have become targets of arbitrary detentions. The government has exploited its security strategy to suppress any form of opposition. For instance, leaders of the anti-mining movement were unjustly imprisoned on questionable charges, deprived of due process. Additionally, members of this movement have spoken out against the imprisonment of their relatives, denouncing it as a tactic of intimidation.
A Perpetual State of Emergency?
As Latin America’s electoral calendar for 2024 commences in El Salvador, Bukele and his party’s (potentially fraudulent) triumph presents a dubious prospect of electoral success if the longstanding exchange of security for votes is perpetuated. However, as elucidated in this piece, this Faustian bargain is constructed upon deceitful narratives and entails dire consequences for people’s lives and democracy in the region.
Amidst the enduring hardships imposed by Bukele’s ‘bitter medicine’ and with his state of emergency approaching its second anniversary, the prospect of restoring the State of Law seems like an illusion. Fear-mongering and the myths of his war on gangs are the cornerstones of Bukele’s authoritarian saga. At this juncture, what motivation, if not benevolence, might prompt Bukele to declare an end to his wars? How and when might this modern-day caudillo willingly relinquish the powers he has accrued? Crucially, how might the Salvadoran people break away from his spell and assert their constitutional rights?
Viviana García Pinzón is a researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute ABI in Freiburg, an Associate at the GIGA Institute for Latin American Studies ILAS and a 2023-2024 Fellow at the Centre for the Comparative Study of Civil War based at the University of York. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science with an emphasis on peace and conflict studies from the University of Marburg.
José Salguero is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Marburg, where he has been a lecturer in various seminars since 2021. He holds a doctoral scholarship from the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. Additionally, José is a research associate in the graduate program “Democratising Security in Turbulent Times” at the University of Hamburg. He serves as an elected representative of the Junior Research Group of the German Latin American Studies Association (ADLAF) and is part of the steering committee of the Elite Studies Working Group.
Header image: 14,000 soldiers assemble for an address by President Bukele during the announcement of the fifth phase of the government’s security policy against gangs. San Juan Opico, El Salvador, 23 November, 2022. Source: Casa Presidencial El Salvador.
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