Noboa’s Internal Armed Conflict in Ecuador

Viviana García Pinzón & José Salguero

June 28, 2024

Over the past few months, the headlines about criminal violence in Latin America have been dominated by an unusual suspect, Ecuador. This nation has long been considered a haven of stability and peace in the middle of the world’s most violent region. However, it saw unparalleled increases in violence in recent years, becoming the country with the highest level of lethal violence in Latin America, and half of the top 10 cities with the highest homicide rates in the world in 2023. The takeover of a local television station by members of a criminal group in January 2024 gave further visibility to Ecuador’s deep security crisis. This ruthless spectacle did not occur in a vacuum; instead, it is yet another instance of a steady deterioration of the country’s security landscape. This erosion has seen the capacities of both the judiciary and the state security apparatus gravely diminished over the last few years. After a phase of significant improvements in the security situation, including an ongoing reduction in the murder rate between 2009 and 2018, the country is experiencing one of the worst security crises in its recent history, linked to the strengthening of the cocaine market, organized crime, and the power of criminal groups with varying capacities and geographical reach.

President Daniel Noboa adopted a tough security strategy in response to the worsening criminal war. Following hot on the heels of the attack against the TV Channel, the president called for exceptional powers, deployed the military to patrol the streets, and officially declared a state of non-international armed conflict. In a referendum held on April 21st, the Ecuadorian people approved a series of measures to step up the fight against crime, including the militarization of public security, new judges, harsher sentencing, and the introduction of extradition. The recipe adopted by Ecuador is not dissimilar to the traditional components of mano dura (“Iron Fist”) policies in the region (discussed in Part I of this blog, on El Salvador). These policies have proven ineffective in providing long-term and sustainable solutions to citizens’ security concerns. Instead, they have primarily exacerbated human rights violations and undermined democratic institutions, as seen in the experiences of countries like Honduras, Mexico, and Brazil, or led to the complete dismantling of independent democratic institutions like in El Salvador.

President Noboa starts construction of a new maximum security prison in Santa Elena, June 21, 2024. Source: Presidency of Ecuador.

This article examines the factors behind Ecuador’s security crisis, highlighting the negative impact of a series of justice and security reforms implemented between 2017 and 2022. We argue that the level of violence affecting the country is not exclusively caused by changes in illicit markets and organized crime but, crucially, by a weakened and fragmented state apparatus. A heavy-handed approach will not be able to compensate for this structural deficit. Moreover, and despite the historical limitations of militarisation as a tool for crime control, the seemingly unlimited political gains from a prolonged suspension of constitutional rights, such as the case of El Salvador, might make unending ‘regimes of exception’ an alluring prospect for a new wave of Latin American autocratic rulers.

Trends and scale of violence

Examining Ecuador’s recent history of lethal violence reveals a more intricate narrative than that of a country spontaneously descending into a spiral of violence. Before the current phase, Ecuador had succeeded in enhancing its security conditions. In 2005, the country recorded its highest homicide rate since 1980. However, starting in 2009, lethal violence significantly decreased, reaching its lowest level between 2016 and 2018 at 5.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. This rate was well below the Latin American average of 23 per 100,000 inhabitants for that period. However, the trend has reversed over the last few years. Notably, between 2021 and 2023, the homicide rate surged from 14.7 to 47.2 per 100,000 inhabitants. Ecuador has seen an increase of 574.3% in the number of homicides since 2019.

Homicide Rates in Ecuador (2005-2023)

From a subnational perspective, according to the analysis from the Ecuadorian Observatory of Organised Crime (OECO) for 2023, 7 out of 24 provinces reported staggering homicide rates: El Oro (78.33), Esmeraldas (82.87), Guayas (85.66), Los Ríos (11.83), Manabí (59.52), Santa Elena (64.81), and Sucumbíos (48.74). Regarding the total number of homicides, Guayas recorded the highest count with 3,762 cases, marking an 85% increase from the previous year. This province represents 47% of all homicides nationwide. The provinces reporting the highest homicide rates are all located in borderland territories, which already hints at the pivotal role of transnational organized crime and illicit economies in the dynamics of violence in this country.

However, provinces with fewer homicides have also experienced a significant rise compared to 2022. In the provinces of Zamora Chinchipe, Pastaza, Morona Santiago, and Orellana, the increase exceeds 100%. Since these provinces are located in the Amazon region and not strategically situated along cocaine trafficking routes, this trend may be associated with illegal gold mining and logging (Mantilla, Andrade & Vallejo, 2023; OECO, 2024).

The geography of violence has a marked urban character. Guayaquil and Duran together concentrated more than 35% of the total cases of homicides in 2023. Next is Esmeraldas with 3.83%. Approaching this from the perspective of homicide rates, however, uncovers that El Piedrero, located between the provinces of Guayas and Cañar, is the most violent town in the country with a homicide rate of 476.74 per 100,000 inhabitants. The town is part of the drug entry route from the highlands and the critical ports of Guayaquil and Machala, which are crucial for international drug trafficking (OECO, 2024).

In terms of the homicide dynamics, murders by contract killers and violence against politicians and local officials have been on the rise (ACLED, 2023a; FES, 2023). One of the most prominent examples is the killing of the presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio at a campaign rally in Quito, the capital city, on August 9^th, 2023. The Citizen Observatory of Political Violence registered 88 attacks against political leaders in 2022 and 2023. Violence has increased not only in intensity but also in its most brutal manifestations, including massacres, beheadings, mutilations, and the display of corpses with threatening messages from organized crime groups (Mantilla, Andrade & Vallejo, 2023). Likewise, armed actions such as attacks against armed forces, explosions, and armed clashes have seen unprecedented growth (ACLED, 2023b).

Making sense of the security crisis and rising violence

The current situation in Ecuador results from a combination of regional trends and domestic factors. To understand how violence has evolved in the country, it’s essential to consider three interconnected dimensions. First, the flow of criminal resources (e.g., arms trafficking, illicit economies). Second is the organized crime landscape (i.e., fragmentation of gangs and other criminal groups, expansion of criminal governance, the effects of massive incarceration on gangs’ organizational structure and networks). Third, institutional apparatus (i.e., how both systemic corruption and reforms have diminished state security and judiciary capabilities).

In Ecuador, the percentage of homicides committed with guns has risen from 54.93% in 2019 to 87.94% in 2023. Official reports indicate that the country has gained a more significant role in facilitating arms trafficking routes, within the region with the world’s highest proportion of firearm deaths (UNODC, 2023). It serves as a transit point for the movement of arms from Chile and Peru to Colombia, the United States, Europe, and Asia (Insight Crime, 2021; Ojo Público, 2024). Some of the firearms also end up in the hands of organized crime groups. Numerous seizures of heavy-caliber weapons have been made in prisons controlled by Los Choneros, Lobos, and Lagartos, some of the most prominent criminal groups in the country (Insight Crime, 2021).

Similar to the developments in firearms trafficking, Ecuador’s role in the cocaine market has expanded, moving from a transit country to a central location for production, refinement, storage, and shipment (Rivera-Rhon & Bravo-Grijalva, 2020; Mantilla & Rivera, 2024). The implementation of Plan Colombia and intensified interception initiatives by the US Coast Guard in the Caribbean have increased the attractiveness of the Ecuador-Colombia borderlands. Consequently, there has been more intense involvement from Mexican criminal organizations, the Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) cartels, in the workings of the cocaine traffic networks in Ecuador and the control of cocaine routes from Ecuador to Central America (Ferri, 2023; Mantilla & Rivera, 2024; Ruiz y Cazar, 2018).

President Noboa inspecting the seizure of narcotics 169 nautical miles from the Port of Manta. Credit: Isaac Castillo/Presidency of Ecuador.

From 2010 to 2021, Ecuador’s organized crime constellation has been defined by the hegemony of Los Choneros (Dalby, 2023; Mantilla & Rivera, 2024). Using prisons as operational hubs, this group diversified its criminal activities from drug trafficking to extortion, contract killings, and smuggling (InsightCrime, 2023a). Los Choneros boasted international connections, working with Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations while also maintaining alliances with Ecuadorian gangs operating at the national level, notably Los Tiguerones and Los Chone Killers (Dalby, 2023).

However, the signing of the 2016 Colombian peace agreement and the exit of the FARC-EP, which used to be one of the biggest players in the coca/cocaine economies, marked a shifting point in the constellation of criminal actors and power in Ecuador. The immediate result has been increased fragmentation and more prevalent inter- and intra-group competition. FARC dissident groups entered the fray to contest control of the cocaine market and routes in both Colombia and Ecuador (Verdad Abierta, 2018). International criminal actors, including Albanian, Italian, and Mexican groups, have sought greater involvement and power over Ecuador’s cocaine trafficking routes, namely control over strategic ports. Fuelled by increasing violent disputes with other Ecuadorian criminal groups and factional infighting, Los Choneros lost its hegemonic position (Insight Crime, 2023b; Mantilla & Rivera, 2024).

Transitioning from a model of criminal hegemony to a fragmented one has prompted disputes not only among armed groups but among political/state actors, with instances of violent actions against politicians and state security forces. Targeting political actors is a part of broader strategies of what has been called ‘violent lobbying’ (Lessing, 2015). Yet a crucial aspect to consider is the impact of the country’s security and justice systems’ fragmentation following a series of reforms initiated in 2018 under the presidential administration of Lenin Moreno (Mantilla, Andrade & Vallejo, 2023; Pontón, Rivera & Amores, 2020).

As previously mentioned, Ecuador reduced homicides by nearly 75% between 2009 and 2018. This result can be partially attributed to the citizen security policy that combined punitive strategies with social prevention measures during the government of Rafael Correa (2007-2017) (Córdova-Alarcón, 2024). However, research in other settings (Cruz & Durán Martínez, 2018) shows that the reduction in homicides does not imply a weakening of organized crime or illegal economies. On the contrary, this period saw the organizational strengthening of criminal groups, particularly Los Choneros, in the country’s prisons. It has been argued that the growing complexity of criminal groups was fuelled by the increased incarceration rates prompted by Correa’s punitive criminal policy (Pontón, Rivera & Amores, 2020). According to Córdova-Alarcón (2024), the grey zone of criminality, constituted by relations between state and criminal actors, expanded during Correa’s second term.

The Moreno and Lasso administrations made only symbolic gestures to address this issue, if not actively enabling it. In fact, starting in 2017, Moreno initiated a comprehensive reform process that undermined the government’s ability to guarantee security and governance for its citizens. This thorough dismantling of the security apparatus began with the dissolution of the Ministry of Security Coordination, which was responsible for strategic planning and public policy across sectors (the administration cited the need to cut state spending as justification).

In September 2018, the National Intelligence Secretariat was shuttered, with its responsibilities shifted to the Strategic Intelligence Centre. By November 2018, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and Cults (MJDDH) was restructured into the Human Rights Secretariat, while prison management, previously overseen by the MJDDH, was transferred to the newly established National Prison Administration (SNAI). December 2018 saw the merger of the Ministry of the Interior and the Secretariat of Public Administration into the Ministry of Government. Subsequent decrees in April 2022 redefined the Ministry of Government’s structure, culminating in the establishment of the National Secretariat for Public and State Security in August 2022. Mantilla, Andrade & Vallejo (2023) assert that amidst a backdrop characterized by the evolving dynamics among criminal actors – with significant shifts in power balances, an escalating trend of coca cultivation, and the profound socio-economic repercussions of COVID-19, the erosion of capacities within the security and justice systems has significantly heightened opportunities for the advancement of criminal groups.

Myths, Stories, and False Promises

Based on our previous article and the evidence discussed here for Ecuador, it is clear that, on their own, punitive measures to combat crime have yet to be effective anywhere in Latin America. This is the hard truth. However, beyond any technical analysis, we must recognize that stories matter for our political imagination, and it is precisely in the gap between problem-solving and the making of false promises where authoritarian sentiments are currently being redefined and reinterpreted in Latin America.

Thus, it matters that President Noboa was the first one to arrive in El Salvador to congratulate Nayib Bukele on the first day of his unconstitutional second term as president. It matters that he claims to be “interested in knowing more about the Territorial Control Plan and other policies implemented by El Salvador to achieve a noticeable improvement of the security situation.” It matters because it neglects the moral debate inherent to democratic institutions while perpetuating myths of effectiveness beyond the tangible limitations of replicating such a security agenda in Ecuador. It matters because it strengthens the myth of a trade-off between safety and political freedom.

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa (left) and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele.
Source: Presidency of Ecuador.

Yet perhaps not all hope is lost. In April 2024, during the same referendum that validated Noboa’s extreme security strategy, up to 69% of Ecuadorians voted against the legalization of hourly labour, a key component of his economic plan. These results, at the very least, should invite us to believe that democratic institutions can still limit executive political action. Perhaps, unlike in El Salvador, reductions in homicide rates need not go hand-in-hand with complete concentration of political power. Perhaps, in Ecuador, there is still a chance of a robust security strategy that considers control, prevention, and long-term sustainability in addressing crime.

Viviana García Pinzón is a researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute ABI in Freiburg, an Associate at the GIGA Institute for Latin American Studies ILAS and a 2023-2024 Fellow at the Centre for the Comparative Study of Civil War based at the University of York. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science with an emphasis on peace and conflict studies from the University of Marburg.

José Salguero is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Marburg, where he has been a lecturer in various seminars since 2021. He holds a doctoral scholarship from the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. Additionally, José is a research associate in the graduate program “Democratising Security in Turbulent Times” at the University of Hamburg. He serves as an elected representative of the Junior Research Group of the German Latin American Studies Association (ADLAF), and is a member of the Central American Initiative Network (Red-ICA).

Cover image source: Presidencia de la República del Ecuador

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